Stephen walker liquidating

Moreover, there is another possibly salient fact: The plaintiff justifies having commenced this litigation by asserting that

Moreover, there is another possibly salient fact: The plaintiff justifies having commenced this litigation by asserting that $1M[illion] had gone overseas through the tenth defendant, Marbain Pty Ltd, a company controlled by Mr Landeryou and Mr Cass, but now in liquidation.The judgment doesn’t explain whether the liquidator alleges that this $1 million was unlawfully appropriated by Cass and Landeryou’s company from MUSU, or what happened to it after it was shipped overseas, or what prospects (if any) there might now be of recovery.As far as the balance of convenience is concerned, if Mr Mc Veigh has a simple explanation for the figures in the ASIC return, no doubt he can give it to the creditors and others interested in the MUSU liquidation.Not surprisingly in the circumstances, Hollingworth J declined to grant an injunction to the liquidator.Company liquidators generally don’t have a client in any meaningful sense, at least not one with any real vested interest in ensuring that the liquidator doesn’t overcharge or pursue unlikely avenues of possible recovery mostly in order to maximise fee income.Generally the company’s shareholders have no expectation of ever recovering anything in the liquidation and therefore don’t give a stuff what the liquidator does; the directors are inherently suspect because they were the people who sent the company broke in the first place; and very commonly no single creditor is owed a large enough sum to create a strong vested interest in closely overseeing the liquidator’s activities.In more general terms, this case brings into sharp focus the whole area of corporate liquidations.Leaving aside the specific facts of this case, I’ve always thought that there is a massive conflict between a company liquidator’s duty to maximise recovery in the interests of creditors (and in rare cases, shareholders) and the liquidator’s self-interest in maximising his own fees.

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Moreover, there is another possibly salient fact: The plaintiff justifies having commenced this litigation by asserting that $1M[illion] had gone overseas through the tenth defendant, Marbain Pty Ltd, a company controlled by Mr Landeryou and Mr Cass, but now in liquidation.

The judgment doesn’t explain whether the liquidator alleges that this $1 million was unlawfully appropriated by Cass and Landeryou’s company from MUSU, or what happened to it after it was shipped overseas, or what prospects (if any) there might now be of recovery.

As far as the balance of convenience is concerned, if Mr Mc Veigh has a simple explanation for the figures in the ASIC return, no doubt he can give it to the creditors and others interested in the MUSU liquidation.

Not surprisingly in the circumstances, Hollingworth J declined to grant an injunction to the liquidator.

Company liquidators generally don’t have a client in any meaningful sense, at least not one with any real vested interest in ensuring that the liquidator doesn’t overcharge or pursue unlikely avenues of possible recovery mostly in order to maximise fee income.

Generally the company’s shareholders have no expectation of ever recovering anything in the liquidation and therefore don’t give a stuff what the liquidator does; the directors are inherently suspect because they were the people who sent the company broke in the first place; and very commonly no single creditor is owed a large enough sum to create a strong vested interest in closely overseeing the liquidator’s activities.

In more general terms, this case brings into sharp focus the whole area of corporate liquidations.

M[illion] had gone overseas through the tenth defendant, Marbain Pty Ltd, a company controlled by Mr Landeryou and Mr Cass, but now in liquidation.

The judgment doesn’t explain whether the liquidator alleges that this

Moreover, there is another possibly salient fact: The plaintiff justifies having commenced this litigation by asserting that $1M[illion] had gone overseas through the tenth defendant, Marbain Pty Ltd, a company controlled by Mr Landeryou and Mr Cass, but now in liquidation.The judgment doesn’t explain whether the liquidator alleges that this $1 million was unlawfully appropriated by Cass and Landeryou’s company from MUSU, or what happened to it after it was shipped overseas, or what prospects (if any) there might now be of recovery.As far as the balance of convenience is concerned, if Mr Mc Veigh has a simple explanation for the figures in the ASIC return, no doubt he can give it to the creditors and others interested in the MUSU liquidation.Not surprisingly in the circumstances, Hollingworth J declined to grant an injunction to the liquidator.Company liquidators generally don’t have a client in any meaningful sense, at least not one with any real vested interest in ensuring that the liquidator doesn’t overcharge or pursue unlikely avenues of possible recovery mostly in order to maximise fee income.Generally the company’s shareholders have no expectation of ever recovering anything in the liquidation and therefore don’t give a stuff what the liquidator does; the directors are inherently suspect because they were the people who sent the company broke in the first place; and very commonly no single creditor is owed a large enough sum to create a strong vested interest in closely overseeing the liquidator’s activities.In more general terms, this case brings into sharp focus the whole area of corporate liquidations.Leaving aside the specific facts of this case, I’ve always thought that there is a massive conflict between a company liquidator’s duty to maximise recovery in the interests of creditors (and in rare cases, shareholders) and the liquidator’s self-interest in maximising his own fees.

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Moreover, there is another possibly salient fact: The plaintiff justifies having commenced this litigation by asserting that $1M[illion] had gone overseas through the tenth defendant, Marbain Pty Ltd, a company controlled by Mr Landeryou and Mr Cass, but now in liquidation.

The judgment doesn’t explain whether the liquidator alleges that this $1 million was unlawfully appropriated by Cass and Landeryou’s company from MUSU, or what happened to it after it was shipped overseas, or what prospects (if any) there might now be of recovery.

As far as the balance of convenience is concerned, if Mr Mc Veigh has a simple explanation for the figures in the ASIC return, no doubt he can give it to the creditors and others interested in the MUSU liquidation.

Not surprisingly in the circumstances, Hollingworth J declined to grant an injunction to the liquidator.

Company liquidators generally don’t have a client in any meaningful sense, at least not one with any real vested interest in ensuring that the liquidator doesn’t overcharge or pursue unlikely avenues of possible recovery mostly in order to maximise fee income.

Generally the company’s shareholders have no expectation of ever recovering anything in the liquidation and therefore don’t give a stuff what the liquidator does; the directors are inherently suspect because they were the people who sent the company broke in the first place; and very commonly no single creditor is owed a large enough sum to create a strong vested interest in closely overseeing the liquidator’s activities.

In more general terms, this case brings into sharp focus the whole area of corporate liquidations.

million was unlawfully appropriated by Cass and Landeryou’s company from MUSU, or what happened to it after it was shipped overseas, or what prospects (if any) there might now be of recovery.

As far as the balance of convenience is concerned, if Mr Mc Veigh has a simple explanation for the figures in the ASIC return, no doubt he can give it to the creditors and others interested in the MUSU liquidation.

Not surprisingly in the circumstances, Hollingworth J declined to grant an injunction to the liquidator.

Company liquidators generally don’t have a client in any meaningful sense, at least not one with any real vested interest in ensuring that the liquidator doesn’t overcharge or pursue unlikely avenues of possible recovery mostly in order to maximise fee income.

Generally the company’s shareholders have no expectation of ever recovering anything in the liquidation and therefore don’t give a stuff what the liquidator does; the directors are inherently suspect because they were the people who sent the company broke in the first place; and very commonly no single creditor is owed a large enough sum to create a strong vested interest in closely overseeing the liquidator’s activities.

In more general terms, this case brings into sharp focus the whole area of corporate liquidations.

It is difficult to see how they might have the relevant tendency.

The remarkable thing about the case is that the judge, Justice Hollingworth, seems to think at least the last of those claims is pretty fair and reasonable on the factual material before her!

The liquidator seeks to prevent the publication of any allegation that he is not or was not interested in achieving a financial return for MUSU creditors.

In a circular to creditors dated 16 December 2005, regarding “The Man Who Stole Christmas”, Mr Cass made various assertions including the following: that the MUSU liquidation involved “schemes, the rorts and the gross mismanagement” and had gone “from bad to worse”; that the Madgwicks partner, Mr Levy, was Mr Mc Veigh’s “Partner-in-Crime” in spending millions of dollars on fees; that Mr Mc Veigh’s conduct was under investigation by “a number of MPs”; that Mr Mc Veigh is incompetent; and that Mr Mc Veigh is not interested in maximising the financial return for creditors.

Enclosed with the circular was a copy of the liquidator’s Form 524 report to ASIC dated 5 September 2005, annotated with Mr Cass’s comments.

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